NATO researchers are now studying cognitive warfare, and it should change how you think about influence


I came across the term “cognitive warfare” during completely different research and stopped.

Not because the term was unfamiliar. I’ve heard variations of this before in contexts that seemed abstract and distant, military strategy, intelligence analysis, something that sounds like it belongs in a briefing room rather than an article I’d personally find useful.

What stopped me was the definition.

Cognitive warfareas researchers working in and around NATO structures have tried to formalize it, the use of information and social influence to change people’s thinking, feeling and behavior without them realizing it is happening.

I sat with this for a moment.

Because if you take off the military framework, you are left with a fairly accurate description of many things that we already live with every day.

Why is a military alliance studying your attention?

I must admit, when I first found out that NATO researchers were working on this, I was momentarily confused. The mental image is not entirely predictable: generals in conference rooms debating what makes a person more susceptible to a viral tweet.

But the logic makes sense if you follow it. Modern conflicts are increasingly taking place in an informational environment rather than on physical terrain. If you can destabilize the thinking of the population, how clear you are, how confident you are in your own understanding, then you have achieved something strategically significant without using any resources.

in 2021 François du Cluzelpublished a study in cooperation with the NATO Innovation Center in which he tried to define cognitive warfare as its own separate field. The document is worth reading, not because it tells you everything you didn’t feel, but because it names with unusual precision what you did feel.

The main claim is this: you don’t have to convince people that something is false. You can simply degrade their ability to think clearly and the rest will follow.

An overburdened person, an emotionally destabilized person, full of conflicting information and too exhausted to sort through it, wherever certainty is offered. By default, they choose what looks familiar. They stop asking questions.

This is the mechanism. And no military action is required to activate it.

A fast brain is the goal

One of the things I find really illuminating about this research is how it maps onto what we already know about cognition.

The brain processes information in two ways. One is the fast, automatic, pattern matcher: the system that allows you to navigate everyday life without exhausting yourself with every little decision. The other is slower and more deliberate, the mode that kicks in when we evaluate an argument, weigh evidence, and decide whether something is actually true.

The fast system is no worse. This is necessary. But it is also the one that reacts most strongly to emotional prominence, to repetition, to a sense of urgency, to social pressure, to what everyone around you believes.

Effective influence operations, whether from state actors or platforms whose incentives happen to point in the same direction, target this fast system almost exclusively. The point is not to win an argument. The point is that the slower, more cautious mode of reasoning is never activated.

If one remains emotionally reactive, cognitively saturated, and socially insecure, one has essentially lost the ability to think about what is going on with one’s thinking. This is not a conspiracy. This is closer to a design problem.

Where it really gets controversial

What I keep coming back to, and what I find most troubling, is that lying is not really the most effective tool here.

If you lie to someone, there is always the risk that they will encounter conflicting evidence and become skeptical of you. But when you flood the information environment with ambiguity, contradictions, and competing narratives, you produce something much more useful: epistemic paralysis.

People don’t know what to believe. And in this state, they don’t think more critically. They think little. They revert to emotional commitments, whatever their group says, to the interpretation that requires the least additional effort to maintain.

In other words, disorientation is more effective than deception. It is easier to push someone who is already confused than someone who has just been told the wrong thing.

I find this useful to know, not because it solves anything, but because it reframes the feeling of being overwhelmed by conflicting information. This feeling is not only unpleasant. This is a state of heightened vulnerability. The moment you feel most confused about what is true is the moment you are most receptive to the first answer that comes to you and feels emotionally fulfilling.

Knowledge of technology is a form of protection in itself

There is research based on the so-called inoculation theory, which I find unexpectedly encouraging in this context. The basic idea comes by analogy from immunology: debilitating exposure to something, combined with an explanation of how it works, can build resistance to the real thing.

In relation to influence and misinformation, this means that explaining the techniques of manipulation, not fact-checking specific false claims, but describing the actual steps, reduces susceptibility to them. THE 2020 study Published in the Harvard Misinformation Review, they found that these types of prebunking interventions worked across cultures and demographics. The effect was not huge. But he was consistent.

Knowing that a technique exists will make you somewhat less vulnerable to it. Not immune. Slightly less vulnerable.

It’s a humble but real thing to hold on to.

It’s a question of the environment

Something I’ve been thinking about more seriously is that cognitive vulnerability is not a stable personal trait. Fluctuate. And what it fluctuates in response to is largely environmental.

Chronic stress impairs the brain’s capacity for deliberate, careful reasoning. Sleep deprivation does the same thing. Persistent information overload causes attentional fatigue, which makes it really difficult to appreciate what you encounter. Social isolation, in its own way, makes belonging and certainty more urgent, which increases the appeal of any community that offers both.

The conditions of modern information life, continuous scrolling, algorithmic calibration of emotional states, platforms built specifically to maximize engagement actively create the cognitive conditions that influence actions. In most cases, it is not planned. As an emergent property of systems that reward reactivity over reflection.

This is important because it means that the question is not simply “am I thinking critically?” Critical thinking is a skill and is more or less available depending on the state you are in. Research on emotion regulation has shaped how I interpret this: what appears to be a failure of intelligence or discipline is often a failure of the conditions under which clear thinking is actually possible.

You can be analytically sharp and still very receptive if you’re tired enough, overwhelmed, or unsure enough about where you belong.

Sovereign Mind lens

This is exactly the kind of problem Sovereign Mind Framework purpose: what does it really take to think clearly in an environment that prevents this with structural incentives?

  • Unlearning: The assumption is that the manipulation also happens to other people, the less educated, the less demanding. Cognitive warfare research is quite straightforward about this: the techniques work precisely by bypassing the self-monitoring processes we use to assess whether we are being misled. High analytical ability offers much less protection than most analytical people assume.
  • Renovation: The cognitive capacity for deliberate reasoning is finite and is depleted by overload, emotional activation, and fragmented attention. His defense is less about discipline and more about dealing with the conditions that erode it: reducing unnecessary input, noticing when emotional excitement is offered as a substitute for evidence, giving slower thinking the conditions it needs to actually work.
  • Protection: Knowing the specific steps to take against your attention is a true form of resistance. It is not paranoia to ask whether something is designed to engage reasoning or bypass it altogether, and to remain alert to informational environments that seem to overwhelm rather than inform. This is proportional awareness.

What changes when you see clearly

I want to be careful that this does not become an argument for cynicism. This would be its own epistemic failure and, somewhat ironically, facilitate manipulation. A person who trusts nothing is almost as susceptible as a person who trusts everything; they are simply sensitive to different things.

But I think this research gives useful language to what many people already feel. The consumption of news and the end result is more stimulating and somehow less clear. The feeling that certain environments seem to create urgency and fear rather than understanding. It feels like a conversation is being overpowered, not with better arguments, but with emotional pressure and social force.

These are not merely personal failures. They are the predictable results of techniques that are widely used, sometimes intentionally, sometimes as a side effect of other incentives that happen to produce the same result.

Understanding this does not solve the problem. But that begs the question. Instead of asking “why can’t I think more clearly?” he begins to ask, “Actually, what conditions allow me to think clearly?” This is a more answerable and honest question.

In my own research into emotion regulation, I always encounter the same basic pattern: what appears to be a failure of individual ability is often a failure of context. The person hasn’t changed. The conditions are there. This finding, which has been repeated in dozens of studies, is also valid here with unusual directness.

Final thought

Cognitive warfare as a formal concept will continue to evolve. The research from the institutions that examine it constantly bleeds into how we understand influence in contexts that have nothing to do with geopolitics.

What I take from it is something quite simple. The primary target of effective manipulation is not your beliefs. Primarily your ability to carefully evaluate beliefs.

Which means guarding this capacity with attention control, epistemic humility, and working awareness of when emotional arousal is used as a substitute for evidence is something closer to a practice than a personality trait.

It won’t make you invulnerable. The research is honest about what individuals can do in the face of structural forces. But there’s a real difference between roughly understanding how something works and not understanding it at all.

This difference seems to be worth something.



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